Different reasons for such a position is conceivable. Since the original exchange between HS and myself, I see that Kway Teow Man has posted a piece arguing that not only should the government not "go into the business of "happiness engineering"", in fact, "it is not the role of a Government to provide a good life for its citizens. The Government's role is to provide opportunities for the people to provide a good life for themselves." In addition, he adds in the comments that he "believes not in a Singapore Dream, but that each Singaporean would be empowered to his/her dreams. Some will succeed, while others will fail. But for having tried, all will be better off and theirs would be a life worth living." I see his conclusion and mine as versions of each other--though in his case, the main argument is from economics: any more robust conception of what a government can be expected to deliver is unsustainable in the long run.

The reason I gave in the earlier piece, also subsequently highlighted in the comments is different: given that people tend to have different conceptions of happiness, it would be at best fultile for a government to attempt to make the citizens happy. For according to which or whose conception of happiness would it do that? It might even be tyranny--because given that if a government (which means that authority and coercion is never far behind) seeks to actually promote happiness, and given that it will necessarily be a specific conception of what happiness amounts to that is being promoted, those who do not share the specific conception of happiness, or worse still, whose conception of happiness is incompatible with that being promoted by the government, will suffer.

Let me give a rather Singaporean example to explain what I mean by the above. Suppose the Singapore government not merely engages in the mundane business of promoting economic development, macro-economic stablity, business-and-job-friendly policies, the provision of public goods, etc., but actively promotes a specific conception of happiness, say, the notion that material well-being just is happiness, then anyone who disagrees--whether a Christian who aims to seek first the kingdom of God and His righteousness, while casting aside worries to do with "what will we eat, drink or wear" (Matt 6:31-33), or a environmentalist who sees living in a manner that does not place an undue burden upon the biosphere as an essential component of genuine happiness thus abnegating from unbridled materialism, or an artist who sees the peak of existence in unbridled creativity and free expression while eschewing the vulgarity of consummerism--will soon find himself on the receiving end. Remember, we are talking about a government with all the attendant apparatus of coercion and control at its disposal, promoting a specific conception of happiness.

So framed, the position I have in mind is dependant upon the following claim: people (in Singapore, say) do have different conceptions of what makes for happiness, of what the good life consists in. But one must be clear about what the claim says. It does not (merely) say that we do not agree 100% on what constitutes the good life. Rather, the point is that where we do disagree (which might well be quantitively a very small percentage against the background of large agreements, and might well involve only a minority of Singaporeans), the different positions taken can be very contentious, and more importantly, entail incompatible requirements. That is: some of these differences are disagreements. A government cannot--at the same time and in the same respect--both attempt to promote one conception and another; and to promote one conception just is to snub another conception.

Note also that so conceived, the disagreements I have in mind is a subset of what is sometimes called "moral diversity" or "the fact of moral pluralism", though the paradigm case is religious diversity: the great faiths of the world are known to have incompatible (to varying degrees) metaphysical implications and more importantly, ethical requirements, in some cases, even social-political requirements. This is not to say that there are also broad areas of agreements (so well emphasized to the advantage of the state by our doctrine of "religiouis harmony"), but merely the point that where they do differ, the positions taken are incompatible. In many cases, very contentiously incompatible. Other sorts of diversity (e.g., ethnic) are not of direct concern to my account.

Furthermore, in presupposing this claim--"the fact of moral pluralism"--I am not taking a stand on whether it is a good thing; and I certainly aim not making the fallicious inference that moral relativism is true. Rather, the claim is that "moral diversity" is an intractable fact that has to be taken into account.

Is empirical data needed to establish that the sort of diversity that I have in mind exist in Singapore? In a sense, the data already exist. If even only a fraction of the known Catholics, the Protestants, the Muslims, the Hindus, the Buddhists take seriously the various (well publicized) doctrinal claims internal to each religion (not to mention each sub-sect with each faith) with implications for a conception of the good life and good society, we will already have enough on hand for what I called the fact of moral pluralism. Again, this is not to discount the broad areas of agreements, but merely to point out that where we differ, we often disagree. And it is against a backdrop such as the above that I framed the argument in terms of "diversity".

Yet, there is a sense in which I do think that empirical data may be only of limited relevance. Suppose it turns out that the vast majority of Singaporeans share the same conception of happiness. Put another way, suppose there really is such a thing as a unitary "Singapore Dream" that almost everybody subscribes to. Does it follow that it would be the government's job to secure this happiness--rather than, again, the general-purpose conditions that are conducive to the pursuit of different conceptions of happiness? I suggest that the answer is "No"--wouldn't it depend upon what that conception is?

To see this point, consider the following thought experiment. Suppose the vast majority of Singaporeans consider unbridled consummerism, and materialism without regard to any impact to the environment whether local or on other shores, to be the acume of happiness (the dissenting minority is weak, and being weak, meek and unobjecting), would the merely empirical fact of that agreement make it a good thing for the government to make it its business to secure this happiness? If the answer is "no", then the fact of agreement is no longer the only relevant factor.

I suspect that at the end of the day, one area of disagreement and agreement between HS and myself comes down to this. I am actually quite willing to concede that most Singaporeans share--if not an identical--at least an overlapping conception of something in the region of "good life". But I don't think what we share is actually a substantive conception of happiness and good as much as an idea of what the intuitive and commonsensical general purpose conditions are that can be used by people for the pursuit of their own dreams, or are at least conducive to our happiness. There might be some debate on just how thick this agreement is--it is just a matter of economic opportunity, peace and security, or does it include more? But at the end of the days, these are still the necessary conditions for happiness as oppose to happiness itself.

* * * * *

coda:

What about the LAGOs and the LEGOs from HS's own account? What about the conception of a "good society"? I had earlier wanted to post a detailed commentary and critique of HS's arguments. (In fact, I still have my notes for that.) But rather than do that, I will merely content myself with a briefer statement and some, rather more desultory comments.

HS's arguments are interesting. They illustrate nicely that a proper account of the conditions of happiness must match the full richness of human life. But what has any of that got to do with the role of the government? In any case, my account does not assume or imply that people in general are actually happy just as long as the economy are doing well, there is peace and security, etc. My position is that--with respect to the citizens' happiness--the government should focus on the general purpose conditions that can be used by people for the pursuit of happiness however they conceive it. Even if the government does that job superlatively, it will not follow that anyone is happy. The citizens still have to actually make use of the conditions provided to pursue happiness.

There is also no assumption that most people have an individualistic conception of happiness. In fact, it is empirically very implausible to think that the majority of people (anywhere) have an individualistic conception of happiness. Most people in our ordinary experience care not only about themselves, but are concerned in various degrees for the happiness of their loved ones, friends, colleagues, sometimes, even the wellbeing of the unfortunate both here and elsewhere in the world (witness the outpouring of sympathy after the 2005 Boxing Day Earthquake and Tsunami). What happens to others (normally a restricted set) usually have some bearing on the happiness of most people. Conversely, it is actually very rare to find someone with a genuinely individualistic conception of happiness. The issue I am trying to address is this: given a variety of conceptions of happiness, and even given that some of these conceptions are individualistic, most are not, and some even make essential reference to the actualisation of the Good Society, what is the just role of the government? My position privileges no one group: if the government is doing its job right, then whether your conception of happiness is individualistic or non-individualistic, and (not the same thing) whether it makes essential reference to the actualisation of the Good Society or not, you have the freedom and opportunity to pursue your conception--as long as you are willing to respect the right of others to do likewise.

There is more that can be said, but I will rest for now.

afterthought: not unrelated.

very late update (Jan 8, 2006): article from Spiked.