The Modernization of the PLA
By ringisei on 22 Sep 2006 8:19 PM
Haloscan
MG Zhu Chenghu
Major General Zhu Chenghu spoke on "The Modernization of the People's Liberation Army" at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore) on 25 Aug 2006. MG Zhu is Professor and Commandant, College of Defence Studies, National Defence University, People's Liberation Army and attracted media attention last year when he speculated on how, in the event of a conflict, China might respond to US surgical air strikes with nuclear strikes on US cities.

A couple of comments before my somewhat jumbled and belated notes on the talk. Firstly, content - MG Zhu hardly said anything new, groundbreaking or controversial. He himself pointed that a lot of what he said had already been well-covered by the Western media and the Pentagon. I was also slightly surprised by how less traditional military concerns like peacekeeping or terrorism were not even mentioned. While carefully watching the growth of Chinese military capabilities, Singapore continues to build ties to China via defence diplomacy though the overall relationship has had its ups and downs.

Secondly, style - the tone and presentable was calibrated to be reassuring and emollient; speaking in very good English, MG Zhu succeeded in coming across as friendly, eminently reasonable and humorous - a complete contrast to his firebreathing ultranationalist image from the 'nuke the US' incident. I was thinking that it would great if more Singaporean officials could display similar panache and public speaking savvy.

Thirdly, more visits and talks by PRC officials can be a positive way for Singapore and institutions like the IDSS to lubricate Track II diplomacy as well as to serve as a venue for engagement and confidence-building with other parties. Being in the position of the grass, it's better for Singapore if the elephants don't fight and continue to engage at a high level e.g. the recent Shanghai symposium on 'China as a Global Player' 2nd Trilateral Forum organized by the HEI Center for China Policy Analysis on 16-17 Sep 2006 (FT article).

I. PLA modernization has been shaped by three main factors:

1. History of modern China: victim of imperialism, exploitation and oppression. Vividly illustrated when Chinese tourists visit the West and are shocked and humiliated at how many cultural treasures were looted from China and now on display in Western museums. Causes of such national humiliation included social evils, backwardness, corruption, incompetence of the ruling class, disunity of the military. Military was consistently weak and backward in terms of both technology and organization.

2. Study of other wars: Israel over Syria, Gulf War (1991), Kosovo. The use of electronic warfare and precision guided weapons, warfare under hi-tech conditions. But not just technology but also the importance of well-trained soldiers, advanced doctrine and suitable organization.

Most weapons systems in PLA are 10-20 years behind state of the art systems. Precision-guided and long distance strike capabilities have made great changes in the situation. E.g. night operations is one of the areas where the PLA has been strong but the above strike capabilities combined with improved night vision technology allows such militaries to attack continuous day and night.

3. No immediate threat from neighbours: however China continues to lag further behind in weapons and technology and it is difficult to maintain a stable environment as the gap increases (reducing China's deterrence credibility).

PLA safeguard China's territorial integrity and sovereignty, deter war.

China artificially "splitted" [sic] by Taiwanese separatism. Unification of China will lead to peace and stability -> Chinese economic development -> prosperous China -> peace and stability in East Asia -> virtuous cycle.

[The line of "What's good for China is good for the world" is the central theme of Hu Jintao's "harmonious world" doctrine which has replaced the "peaceful rise" phrase which displeased hawks as it implies the renunciation of the right to use force against Taiwanese de jure independence and displeased doves because "rise" was deemed to connote aspirations to hegemony and sounded too aggressive.]

II. Drive in defence modernization since 1978: only in full swing in mid 1990s (especially in modernization of equipment and technology). Granting of visa for Lee Tenghui's visit to the US awakened the Chinese people.

1. Organizational apparatus being streamlined - cut PLA by 1 million troops.

2. Modern operational theory. People's war developed 22 years before the founding of the PRC. Basic tenets still applicable but need to update some of the content. Some parts not applicable under modern conditions especially night fighting which was very prominent and effective in the past but not anymore.

Assumed that no country will dare to launch a land war against China but the threat now is surgical strikes from the air.

3. Improved training for officers as well as rank and file. Well-trained and qualified otherwise advanced weaponry cannot be fully used. Learnt a lot from the world, especially the US. E.g. Programs similar to the RTOC are now widely introduced as an economic way to attract bright young people into the PLA.

4. Weapons and equipment: in the past 10 years, made remarkable progress. Lots of imports especially from Russia - well-covered and publicized in Western press. Own research and development capability being upgraded.

Improved fighting/operational capability.

Army needs to improve maneuverability. Currently impossible to deploy forces swiftly due to the 20,000 km land border and 12,000 km coast line. Also needs to improve field air defence capability as many air forces have capability for distant strike [force protection]. Need to increase reach, not just increase range of artillery but also new arsenal such as ground to ground missiles.

Navy needs increased firepower (anti-submarine, anti-aircraft carrier, precision strike, blockade, protection of Sea Lines Of Communication).

Air Force's role evolving from territorial defence to forward defence capability. Precision, air superiority, distant strike, air defence of major cities, Three Gorges Dam, nuclear power plants against air strike.

2nd Artillery (Strategic Rocket Forces) is a Service on its own rather than an arm of the other three Services. Working to improve survivability - retaliatory capability against a first strike on China. Don't think that China will go for first use.

[ "... well-publicised comments on 15 July 20005 of Major General Zhu Chenghu, the dean of China's National Defence University. Zhu was reported to have said that in the event that the United States used precision-guided munitions and missiles in a contingency with China, 'war logic' would dictate that China would have to respond with nuclear weapons. Zhu was quick to underline the private nature of his views, which were disowned by Chinese officials, but the remarks were nevertheless studied with concern by US officials. They were cited in the Pentagon's 2006 report to Congress [Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, pp.1-2, 28.], published in May, in the context of whether China might be moving away from a doctrinal nuclear posture of 'no first use' towards a more ambiguous stance intended - in tandem with a reported programme of vigorous technical modernization - to strengthen the credibility and survivability of its deterrent." International Institute of Strategic Studies, Strategic Comments (2006), p. 275.

In response to a question from Dr Daljit Singh (ISEAS) about the above-mentioned comments, MG Zhu replied that his statement was distorted. It had been mentioned in the context of a heated but purely hypothetical discussion among scholars. He himself believes in good relations between the US and PRC and has written a book on this. The Pentagon may be exaggerating the threat for budgetary and other bureaucratic politics reasons. The US seems to need an enemy yet the Pentagon report also notes that China, a big socialist country with a high speed of development, is not an imminent threat, only a potential one. ]

Essential to develop penetration capability especially due to the introduction of missile defence in East Asia; precision strike (difficult and expensive); improve safety and security and prevent any accidents.

"I hope I have been quite transparent. I have told you all the secrets in my mind." [audience laughter]

The modernization of the PLA had been subordinated to national economy and development. Double digit increase in the defence budget since 1995 should be compared against the low base from the early 1980s and mid 1990s when the military budget did not increase and even decrease because the Party asked the PLA for restraint in spending and thus the PLA also contributed to economic development in this way. The current increase is not a cause for concern because:

1. This year's budget is USD 35.1 billion (USD 27 per capita, USD 350 per soldier). Very low when compared to the US ([USD 332 per capita], USD 15,000 per soldier).

2. Intended for defensive purposes. Many concerned by PLA modernization, understandable because China is so big especially Southeast Asian countries are smaller but if one looks as posture, behaviour and history:

a. Posture - not a single soldier deployed overseas (excluding military attaches, UN peacekeeping observers), not a single military base on foreign soil, most forces deployed on South East coast to deter Taiwanese splittism.

b. Behaviour - All military actions by China have been reactive, passive. Forced to take military action.

c. History - It does not mean that China has never expanded in history. Yuan dynasty attacked Vietnam, India, Japan but then under Mongol rule. Han military behaviour not like that at all - busy building the Great Wall for over 2,000 years. Ming dynasty was the largest and strongest state of its era but no exploitation or colonization, brought advanced farming techniques and trade items of porcelain and silk to the lands it visited. [Alistair Iain Johnston's Cultural realism: strategic culture and grand strategy in Chinese history (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995) would contest this interpretation of Ming views on the inutility of force as an instrument of statecraft.]

Misunderstanding by West arises because the West thinks of China from a mirror image perspective of themselves i.e. because they think in imperialist and colonialist terms, therefore China must also want to engage in the same behaviour.

3. Walking on two legs. Import technology but can't afford to buy modernization as many platforms and systems are very expensive. Self-reliance - although Chinese are fast learners, in many parts of the PLA, there are four generations of technology living under one roof.

4. Dedicated against separatist forces in Taiwan.

"My presence is a sign of the PLA's openness and transparency. [laughter from the audience] As an active serving general, it is my duty to promote sound security debates and exchanges which are conducive to mutual understanding, trust and security cooperation."

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1740 words | Categories: Defence, World

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