Examples of nonviolent tactics included strikes, boycotts, marches, civil disobedience, sit-ins, blockades. Cases mentioned ranged from German resistance to French extraction of war reparations in the interwar period, Gandhi's campaign against British colonialism, Danish civil resistance against Nazi occupation, the civil rights movement personified by Martin Luther King Jr, Solidarity in Poland, People Power against Marcos in the Philippines, Argentinian mothers of the disappeared against the junta, the No vote that forced Pinochet from power, democratic transition in Eastern Europe, the Optor movement in Serbia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon and so on.

In Poland (1989), the leaders of Solidarity had learnt from the crushings of the Prague Spring and the Hungarian uprising; they remained steadfastly non-violent as the threat of Soviet military intervention hung over their heads. The key demand was for truly independent trade unions. "All else will follow," said Lech Walesa whose negotiating skills put tremendous pressure on his opposite number from the Polish government. This episode also showed the power of film as the negotiations were broadcast on television and there was no mistaking how uncomfortable, uncharismatic and unconvincing the Communists were.

In Chile (1983), Pinochet's own military-imposed constitution required for a referendum to endorse another term as President. It was unthinkable that he would lose the vote as he had brought economic prosperity to Chile and had clamped down harshly on his main opponents. Ackerman argued that the Chilean case showed that "even the most brutal dictators are more vulnerable than they seem." Activists fanned out through the cities and countryside to convince citizens that the referendum would be fair, that it would not not rigged, and that they could vote no without free of reprisal. These activists also formed the backbone of an independent election monitoring system that tabulated the results using robust statistical sampling. In addition, they were advised to put out a positive message rather than a negative one about human rights abuses and torture; in effect, the No vote was advertised on the mass media as a vote for democracy, social justice and joy. Just as paranoia often end up shoring up authoritarian rule by increasing fear, negative campaigning is also counterproductive as it offers no alternative vision to the status quo. The referendum result was eventually announced by an independent radio station and Pinochet was 'persuaded' to respect the result and step down by the generals in charge of the air force, navy and police.

The Serbia case (2000) was a really interesting case of how a bunch of students became a mass movement. A key step was to organize and behave as if they were already a mass movement with rallies and marches even while they were still just a bunch of students. As with many of the above cases, the movement was highly decentralised to prevent decapitation and extended right down to every street and neighbourhood with local youth leaders providing a recognisable and reassuring face to the rest of the populace. The grassroots are hardly glamorous but are what gives any political movement its reach, durability and strength-in-depth.

Ackerman outlined three general principles of successful non-violent struggles. Firstly, there had to be a unified, broad based leadership with achievable aims. Secondly, the leadership had to plan continuously and evolve beyond the same repetorie as the authorities would gradually learn to cope with them. Thirdly, strict absolute adherence to non-violent discipline. Violence causes support from ordinary civilians and business interests to evaporate, it also gives an excuse for police/armed forces to intervene. "They won't defect if they're being shot at." All three are applicable in normal political contestation. The third is the normative foundation of constitutional political contestation. The second is about innovation and superior tactics compared to the opponent. The first is strategic as any political movement that has a narrow class base will struggle to succeed while framing objectives that do not lack ambition but also do not overreach requires a clear sense of the possible.

Ackerman mentioned how many of the people who trained at the Centre for Non-Violent Conflict were often frustrated by their inability to mobilise the seething discontent in their populations. He told the story of how the opposition in Argentina used confidence building measures to show citizens that they could display their support by driving or walking at half speed at noon and then banging their pots and pans at a set time in the evening. The regime couldn't arrest everyone and the demonstration effects showed people that they were not alone. Breaking this initial barrier then built up momentum that was eventually scaled up to mass demonstrations.

During the Q&A, there was some suspicion that Ackerman could be just another arm of US foreign policy to forment regime change and democracy promotion. He countered that he did not take a single cent from the US government (he pays for everything out of his own very deep pockets); US foreign policymakers were also extremely wary of the concept as it was far too unpredictable, quoting his conversations with senior administration officials, including new Defence Secretary Robert Gates who said: "We don't do regime change." Ackerman threw his hands into the air. "It's not about the US doing regime change, non-violent conflict is about people doing their own regime change!" There was also scepticism expressed about its chance of success in places like North Korea, Burma, Iran or China; a recent case of how Iranian trainees were detained and some tortured for possessing his centre's films.

Ackerman also emphasized that his Centre mainly taught general principles and helped with sharing information and materials (including a sophisticated simulation game with ten different scenarios) about the experiences of other movements' successes and failures, it was up to locals to adapt them to their own conditions. My own takeaways were that his general principles are also applicable to normal political contestation and electioneering: get organized, set appropriate objectives, take action continuously and creatively, keep it non-violent. My other takeway is that those who seek to use the methods he advocates have to seriously examine if their case fits the assumption that the rulers' interests have become utterly divorced from the wider population's. If not, then how can one better represent people's interests than the current regime?