Some have argued that JBJ's setting up of a new party creates a "diversity effect" into Singapore politics. Sin Kek Tong, a Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA) leader, in welcoming JBJ's re-entry into politics commented that, "Maybe there should be more parties to counter [the People's Action Party (PAP)]." On a similar note, WP's organizing secretary, Yaw Shin Leong, commented that "[political] diversity [is] a good thing" when remarking on JBJ's re-entry into politics.

Yet, one should wonder whether the "diversity argument" might instead result in Singaporeans' perception of disunity within the opposition camp. With the JBJ's criticism of his former WP's colleague Low Thia Khiang and the exit of National Solidarity Party from the SDA, certain quarters of the Singapore population may yet lament and focus on the infighting within the opposition parties.

Moreover, some Singaporeans may be forced to ask - would the opposition as a movement be an effective check on the government if they have significant internal issues? Should not these parties set aside their differences and work more closely with each together to share limited resources and information? With limited resources and significant opposing artillery that Singapore opposition faces - will the new party set up JBJ appropriate too much manpower and financial resources from the existing opposition parties? In light of this, opposition parties may face an uphill battle in convincing voters that more opposition parties are indeed better for Singaporeans.

In addition, some political sociologists have argued for a "positive radical flank effect" in social movements. Such a concept posits that external actors offer selective rewards and opportunities to moderate competitor groups in order to isolate or undermine more radical organizations. In the context of Singapore, the appearance of more "radical" political parties or groups - such as that of JBJ's new Reform Party and Chee Soon Juan's Singapore Democratic Party - might pushed the ruling party to engage more with more "moderate" counterparts of the opposition movement such as the WP and the SDA.

Such engagement by the ruling party might come as a form of validating the efficacy of these moderate parties in relations to their more radical counterparts. In effect, that might isolate these "radical" parties from the ruling party and also the mainstream of society. This in turn, may contribute to the decline of these "radical" political parties.

Thus, if we believe the positive radical flank effect, JBJ's reform party is unlikely to make much headway into Singapore politics. The WP and SDA are likely to continue to attract more members and be more successful in electoral politics - both due to their continual dominance on opposition resources as well as certain levels of validation from the PAP.

However, there appears to be two caveats to such an argument. The positive radical flank effect works if the political situation in Singapore remains largely constant and if people's perception of acceptable political strategies does not change. It is possible that political norms and values change over time. For example, changing societal norms on education have meant that radical proposals in the late 1970s - having a smaller class size, de-emphasising on streaming students, emphasising critical thinking on traditional subjects such as chemistry and history and accommodating students with special needs - have been widely accepted by all parties today.

Thus, what is considered a "radical" party, strategy or platform today might be seen as a "moderate" one tomorrow, if societal norms about politics change towards that direction. Similarly, will a "moderate" strategy today be considered too conservative tomorrow? Ironically, will JBJ's new party be more in tune then with the Singaporeans' views of the opposition of tomorrow?