The author and her articles can be found at the blog "The Rot Within".
The most common argument for the immorality of bond-breaking runs along the lines that agreeing to be a scholar involves making a promise of unconditional commitment to the scholarship agency. By unconditional commitment, I mean a commitment on the part of the scholar to return to work for the agency for at least the length of the bond insofar as that is possible.
In this common line of argument, it is immoral to break a bond because doing so violates the promise of unconditional commitment, and violating a promise is immoral.
However, as we all know, the actual legal contract a scholar signs is far from unconditional. Therefore when people assert the existence of a promise of unconditional commitment, this is not to be found in the legal contract itself. It must be something existing outside of the legal contract, as an implicit part of the act of taking up the scholarship.
Here is what is required for the above argument for the immorality of bond-breaking to work:
Premise 1: It is immoral to violate a preexisting promise.
Premise 2: As part of the act of taking up the scholarship, the scholar and the scholarship agency implicitly agree that the scholar has promised to commit herself unconditionally to serving the agency for at least the length of the bond period.
Conclusion 1: From P2, if the scholar breaks her bond when she had an option not to, then she is violating a promise she had made.
Conclusion 2: From P1 and C1, if the scholar breaks her bond when she had an option not to, then she is being immoral.
Therefore, to show that breaking a bond is immoral because it involves breaking a promise, P1 and P2 need to be true. In order to avoid going too deep into the morass of general theories of morality, I ask readers to accept that P1, as a common human intuition, is relatively uncontroversial. So let us let P1 pass, and turn our attention to P2. Note that P2 is, as such, an empirical fact about the world that can, in principle, be verified or falsified. This means, amongst others, that even if I think that a scholarship agreement should contain an implicit promise of unconditional commitment on the part of the scholar, that does not justify my concluding that breaking a bond is immoral. This is because what I think should be the case has nothing to do with the fact as to whether there indeed exists an implicit agreement between the scholar and the scholarship agency. It also means that whether breaking a bond is immoral could differ from scholar to scholar --- if scholar A did make that implicit agreement, then it would be immoral for A to break the bond; if scholar B did not, then it would not be immoral for B to break the bond. Therefore, P2 does not support blanket assertions that all scholars who break bonds are immoral, unless one has good empirical evidence that every scholar who breaks her bond had made an implicit promise of unconditional commitment to her scholarship agency.
In summary, contrary to what one may have intuitively thought, this common argument for the immorality of bond-breaking turns out to hinge on an empirical fact about whether a certain promise was made. No one will know whether the promise was made except by asking the parties to the scholarship agreement themselves. Ultimately, the fate of the argument rests on what was actually agreed upon in the world we live in, not on what we think should be agreed upon in an ideal world.